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CONVICTING
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REFUSING TO ANSWER LAW ENFORCEMENT'S
COMMONSENSE INQUIRIES MAKES NO COMMONSENSE

Hiibel v. Sixth JudicialDistrict Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004)
DianeJ. Zelmer*

While investigating an assault report, a police officer observed a silver
and red GMC truck parked on the roadside with skid marks behind it.'
Petitioner, who appeared intoxicated,2 stood outside the truck, and a young
woman sat inside the truck.3 Threatening arrest, the officer requested
written identification from Petitioner eleven times.4 When Petitioner
refused to comply, the deputy arrested Petitioner for obstructing an officer
in violation of section 199.280 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. 5 The
Justice Court of Union Township convicted Petitioner and fined him
$250.6 In a divided opinion, the Sixth Judicial Court affirmed, finding that
the application of section 171.123 of the Nevada Revised Statutes7 did not
* To my husband, Bobby, for his unconditional love and support.
1. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2455 (2004). The Humboldt County,
Nevada Sheriff's Department received a report that a man assaulted a woman in a red and silver
GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Id.
2. Id. After observing Petitioner's mannerisms, eyes, speech, and odor, the deputy suspected
that Petitioner had operated his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud.
Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev. 2002), aff'd, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
3. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455. The record indicates that the officer observed the woman
sitting on the passenger's side of the cab of the truck. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203.
4. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455.
5. Id. (citing NEV. REV. STAT. 199.280 (2003)). "Hiibel was charged with 'willfully
resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing] a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge
any legal duty of his office' in violation of [the statute]." Id. (first alteration in original). After
refusing to identify himself, Petitioner taunted the officer, daring the officer to arrest him. Id.
6. Id. at 2456. Under Nevada law, Petitioner was charged with a misdemeanor because no
dangerous weapon was used. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203 n. 1.
7. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456. In relevant part, section 171.123 of the Nevada Revised
Statutes provides:

1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters
under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is
committing or is about to commit a crime.
3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain
his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad.
Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to
answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.
4. A person must not be detained longer than is reasonably necessary to effect
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violate Petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights! Reasoning that the
obligation for Petitioner to identify himself during a brief investigatory
stop was a commonsense requirement, the Supreme Court of Nevada also
affirmed.9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in
affirming the decision, HELD, that the Nevada stop-and-identify statutes
did not contravene Petitioner's Fourth Amendment guarantees."°
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures,... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.""
A "seizure" occurs not only upon arrest, but also when an officer restrains
an individual's liberty by either physical force or assertion of authority. 2
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches or seizures, but only
those that are unreasonable. 3 Implicit in the Fourth Amendment is the
notion that each person should maintain individual control of his own
person"4 and remain free from abusive police practices. 5
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court rejected application of the "probable cause"
Warrant Clause requirement of the Fourth Amendment because the context6
required police to act swiftly in response to on-the-spot observations.'
Instead, focusing on the general notions underlying the Fourth
Amendment, 7 the Court employed a balancing test, weighing the

the purposes of this section, and in no event longer than 60 minutes.
NEV. REV. STAT. 171.123 (2003).

8. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2456. The district court reasoned that identitying persons suspected
of domestic violence, assault, and driving under the influence is a "reasonable and necessary"
requirement for protection of officers and victims. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1203-04.
9. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1207. Broadening the reasoning of the district court, the Nevada
Supreme Court stated that identification of any person suspected of a crime is necessary for
protection of the public and law enforcement. Id.
10. Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2457. Supporting its position, the Court indicated that the officer's
"commonsense" request for identification justified arresting Petitioner. See id. at 2460.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20 n. 16 (1968). The test is whether "a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave" given the surrounding circumstances. United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
13. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
14. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
15. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661
(1979)).
16. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. The officer in Terry suspected a contemplated robbery after
observing three individuals peering into a store window and conferring among themselves. Id.at
6. The officer approached the three suspects and patted down their clothing, seizing concealed
weapons. Id. at 6-7.
17. Id. The Court noted that the notions underlying the warrant procedure were applicable
in this context even though the probable cause standard was not. Id.
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government's interest against that of the private citizen.'" The Terry Court
utilized a two-prong reasonableness test to determine whether the officer's
conduct was "justified at its inception, and.., reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' 9
Identifying a narrow exception for the protection of law enforcement
officers,2" the Terry Court concluded that a search for weapons is
reasonable when an officer believes that an individual is armed and
dangerous.2 ' The Court reasoned that the officer's conduct of patting down
the outside of the suspects' clothing in search for weapons represented the
tempered act of a police officer who responded quickly to protect himself
and others from potential danger.22 Furthermore, the officer limited the
scope of the intrusion to the discovery of concealed weapons.23 On policy
grounds, the Court acknowledged that the lower standard of reasonable
suspicion was justified because the circumstances of a Terry stop "amount
to a mere 'minor inconvenience and petty indignity."' 24 Concurring,
Justice White acknowledged that police interrogation is a common
investigative procedure but opined that a refusal to answer questions
during an investigatory stop is no basis for arrest.25
Subsequently, in Brown v. Texas, the Court acknowledged that the
central consideration when applying the balancing test is to ensure that the
government does not arbitrarily invade or restrict a citizen's freedom
solely based on an officer's unfettered discretion.26 As such, a seizure is
unreasonable unless legitimate societal interests require seizure of a
particular individual.27 The effectiveness is determined by "the degree to

18. Id. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967)).
19. Id. at 20.
20. See id. at 27. The officer's authority is limited to searches strictly relating to the
exigencies of weapon discovery. Id. at 25-26.
21. Id. at 27. The Court indicated that an officer acts reasonably in drawing specific
inferences from the facts, not from his own hunch or unparticularized suspicion. Id. But see
Kenneth Gavsie, Note, Making the Best of "Whren ": The Problemswith PretextualTraffic Stops
and the Need for Restraint, 50 FLA. L. REv. 385, 387 (1998) (discussing the limited right of an
officer to act on a hunch when detaining a motorist pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in
Whren v. UnitedStates, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).
22. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28.
23. Id. at 29-30. The protection of the officer and bystanders was the sole justification of the
search. Id. at 29. Therefore, in accordance with the Fourth Amendment, the officer's search was
confined to what was minimally necessary to discover the weapons and disarm the suspects. Id. at
30.
24. Id. at 10-11 (quoting People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 36 (N.Y. 1964)).
25. Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
26. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,51 (1979) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,654-55
(1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
27. Id. at 51. A search is not unreasonable if neutral criteria limit the officer's conduct. See
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which the seizure advances the public interest."28 When detaining a person,
officers must have reasonable suspicion29 that the detainee is involved in
criminal activity.3"
In Brown, the Court held that the officer violated the appellant's Fourth
Amendment rights when the officer detained the appellant and required
him to identify himself pursuant to title 8, section 38.02 of the Texas Penal
Code.3 ' The Court found that, standing alone, appellant's presence in an
alley frequented by drug users failed to meet the reasonable suspicion
standard. 32 Because no basis existed for suspecting misconduct, the right
to personal security outweighed the public's interest in combatting
criminal activity.33
In Hayes v. Florida, the Court rejected the reasonable suspicion
standard, favoring the more stringent probable cause standard outside the
context of an arrest.34 The Court considered whether an officer, in the
absence of probable cause or a warrant, could transport, detain, and
fingerprint a suspect without obtaining consent, prior judicial
authorization, or probable cause." Citing Davis v. Mississippi, the Court
noted that although fingerprinting is a less serious intrusion, temporary
detention at a police station for fingerprinting exceeded the bounds of
investigative stops authorized under Terry.3 6 The Court held that Fourth
Amendment protection applies when an officer without a warrant or
probable cause "forcibly remove[s] a person from his home or otherplace
in which he is entitled to be and transport[s] him to the police station,
where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes.""
In dicta, the Hayes majority attempted to limit its holding to those
circumstances where a suspect is physically removed off-site, suggesting
that an officer may fingerprint a suspect reasonably believed to be
connected with a crime during a brief detention in the field.38 However, the
majority noted that the officer must perform the fingerprinting procedure

28. Id.
29. Id. Objective facts must support a reasonable suspicion that a citizen is implicated in a
crime. Id.; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (requiring police to reasonably suspect that a citizen is
involved in a crime before briefly detaining him).
30. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (citing Prouse,440 U.S. at 663; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 88283).
31. Id. at 53 (citing TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02 (Vernon 1974)).
32. Id. at 52.
33. Id.
34. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985).
35. Id.at 812.
36. Id.at 814 (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,727 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1(1968)).
37. Id. at 816 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
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"with dispatch" to establish or negate the suspect's involvement with the
crime.3 9 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the
judgment but criticized the majority's dicta, opining that any on-site
fingerprinting procedure also must meet the standards established in
Terry.4" In particular, the concurring Justices suggested that on-site
fingerprinting is not a justifiable intrusion under the limitations of Terry
because it is not a necessary procedure to protect the officer from bodily
harm.41
In the instant case's constitutional challenge, while acknowledging that
the police officer asked for written identification, 2 the instant Court
limited its analysis to the Nevada statute requiring only that a suspect
disclose his name.43 Throughout its decision, the instant Court highlighted
the Terry doctrine, which permits an officer who has a reasonable
suspicion to briefly detain a suspect for investigative purposes.' However,
the instant Court noted that the investigatory stop must be justified, be
reasonably
related in scope, be limited in time frame, and not resemble an
45
arrest.

Utilizing the Terry balancing test, the instant Court concluded that the
Nevada statute met the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment
because the identity request related directly to the purpose of the Terry
stop.46 The instant Court found that obtaining a suspect's identity serves
an important governmental interest because identity provides information
regarding a suspect's criminal, violent, and mental disorder behaviors. 7
Reasoning that the Nevada statute did not alter the duration or location of
the Terry stop, the instant Court concluded that no Fourth Amendment
violation occurred.48
Further, the instant Court rejected Petitioner's argument that the
Nevada statute contravened the probable cause standard required under the
Fourth Amendment, and the Court, in effect, allowed an officer to arrest
39. Id. at 817.
40. Id. at 819 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
41. See id.(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
42. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2455 (2004). The officer asked
Petitioner whether "he had 'any identification on [him]."' Id. (alteration in original). The instant
Court understood this as a request for a driver's license or some other written identification. Id.
43. Id. at 2457. The instant Court adopted the Nevada Supreme Court's interpretation of
section 171.123(3) of the Nevada Revised Statutes, requiring that a suspect communicate his name
to an officer through the means of his or her choice. Id.
44. See id. at 2458; supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
45. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2457 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985);
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212
(1979)).
46. Id. at 2459-60.
47. Id. at 2458.
48. Id. at 2459.
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on the basis of mere reasonable suspicion.4 9 The instant Court
acknowledged well-established limitations of the Terry stop as adopted in
Brown and Hayes to address the concern of abusive and arbitrary police
conduct.5 Nonetheless, the instant Court emphasized the Hayes dicta,
suggesting that an officer who meets the reasonable suspicion standard of
Terry may obtain a suspect's identity by compelling the suspect to
acquiesce to fingerprinting during a brief detention. 5 Reasoning that the
request for identification was a commonsense inquiry reasonably related
to the circumstances of the Terry stop, the instant Court held that the
Nevada statute did not circumvent the probable cause guarantee of the
Fourth Amendment.52
Moreover, although the instant Court acknowledged a lengthy history
supporting a detainee's right to decline answering interrogatories during
an investigatory stop, the majority rejected this history as noncontrolling
dicta.53 Stating that a detainee's legal obligation to identify himself arises
from the Nevada statute and not from the Fourth Amendment, the instant
Court found that such dicta did not address the question at issue.54 Three
dissenting Justices criticized the majority, opining that this type of strong
dicta, which has remained undisturbed for over twenty years, is a
statement of the law to the legal community. Recognizing that the instant
Court's decision may extend to requiring a suspect to produce a license
number or residence address, the dissenting Justices expressed concerns
regarding the far-reaching implications of the majority's decision.56
While the instant Court recognized the need to balance the
government's interest against the intrusion on the suspect's liberties, it
nevertheless disregarded Brown in its analysis. 7 Ending its discussion
without analysis by simply acknowledging an important governmental
interest" in the request for identification during a Terry stop,59 the majority
49. Id.
50. id. at 2459-60.
51. Id. (citing Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985)).
52. Id. at 2460.
53. Id. at 2458-59.
54. Id. at 2459.
55. Id. at 2465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2465-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. See id. at 2458-59. But cf Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) ("Consideration
of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity
of the interference with individual liberty.").
58. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458 (holding that an identity request during a Terry stop serves a
strong governmental interest because it may inform the officer of a suspect's criminal, mental, and
violent record). But cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (requiring the officer's action to
reasonably relate in scope to the circumstances justifying the stop). Arguably, the governmental
interest does not survive the scope test because it is justified on Petitioner's potential past actions
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ignored facts relating to the individual's interest against intrusion.'
Moreover, the instant Court did not consider the gravity of the public
concern or the degree to which the public interest was advanced.6 ' Hence,
the majority ignored the policy of protecting citizens from arbitrary
invasion by an officer's unfettered
discretion-a central concern
62
underlying the balancing test.
Even though the majority stated that the foregoing concern is met by
the historic two-prong reasonableness test, the instant Court negated the
test's potential effectiveness with its broad application of Terry.63
Although the second prong of the reasonableness test strictly limits the
scope of the officer's conduct to the circumstances justifying the specific
stop,' the majority indicated that an identity request is central to all Terry
stops.65 In effect, the instant Court eliminated the second prong of the
reasonableness test for all requests involving identity.' The instant Court's
identity generalization dangerously abolished the personal intrusion factor
as well as the requirement to measure
the degree to which the intrusion
67
advances the public's interest.
and not on the current battery investigation. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458.
59. While the instant Court acknowledged the investigation as a Terry stop, the majority
failed to establish when the stop actually implicated the Fourth Amendment. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct.
at 2458.
60. See id. But cf Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-52 (balancing interests in favor of the personal right
to security absent objective facts supporting reasonable suspicion).
61. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458. In the instant case, Petitioner's identity served no purpose
to connect him with the instant suspected battery crime, and thus, the request served no public
interest. See id. Moreover, the instant Court ignored other nonintrusive opportunities to obtain
Petitioner's identity. See id. at 2455; Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Nev.
2002), aff'd, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004). For example, the officer could have requested information
from the female passenger or searched the DMV database for information relating to the vehicle's
license plate, including ownership and insurance records.
62. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458. But cf Brown, 443 U.S. at 51-52 (emphasizing the central
concern of the balancing test).
63. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455-60.
64. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
65. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459 (holding that "identity has an immediate relation to the
purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop" and "[tlhe threat of criminal sanction
helps ensure that the request for identity does not become a legal nullity"). Here, the instant Court
mistakenly supported its position on the supposed risk of "legal nullity" rather than on standards
required under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See id. Especially troublesome is the Court's
position in using criminal sanction for enforcement of an unprecedented position. See id. at 2456,
2461; see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 819 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in thejudgment)
(disregarding the Court's strained effort to uphold on-site fingerprinting as reasonable, opining that
any on-site detention requires application of the standards established in Terry to justify the
intrusion on personal liberties).
66. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459.
67. See id. Arguably, an officer need only show reasonable suspicion to require a suspect to
provide his driver's license, fingerprints, hair follicle, blood, or any other matter containing identity
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Moreover, in finding that the request was reasonably related to the
Terry stop because it was a "commonsense" inquiry unrelated to the
purpose of obtaining an arrest, the instant Court created a two-prong test
that circumvents the scope requirement in all cases, including those not
involving identity.6" The instant Court's failure to narrow the definition of
"commonsense" may lead to an overly broad interpretation,69 permitting
states to enact criminal statutes that prohibit failure to comply with a
variety of police requests.7 ° Such a precedent ignores preconditions
necessary under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to initiate the officer's
conduct.7 '
Further, the instant Court misapplied Terry by disregarding the
underlying purpose central to the narrow Terry exception,72 as well as the
express limitations established therein. 73 Although an arrest inherently
requires transportation of a detainee to the police station,74 the instant
Court found that the Nevada statute did not change the location or duration
of the Terry stop."5 Further, the majority's opinion is devoid of any
analysis justifying how conduct authorized by the Nevada statute does not
resemble a traditional arrest. 76 Thus, while the majority rejected
application of specific Terry limitations to the circumstances of the arrest,
it nonetheless unconvincingly applied the Terry reasonable suspicion

information. See id.at 2465-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Hayes, 470 U.S. at 819 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
68. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460.
69. See id.A broad interpretation of"commonsense" may support conviction on a detainee's
at 2465-66 (Breyer, J.,
refusal to answer any of the officer's questions during a Terry stop. See id.
dissenting); Hayes, 470 U.S. at 819 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Broad application
of the "commonsense" standard also may allow officers to require production of related
documentation. See Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2460; id. at 2465-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Hayes, 470
U.S. at 819 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Such a precedent creates extensive powers
for officers to circumvent the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures by requesting such information during a Terry stop. See Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459-60;
Hayes, 470 U.S. at 819 (Brennan, J., concurring in thejudgment). Moreover, a"commonsense" test
allows an officer to procure an arrest with less than probable cause. See Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459.
70. See Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2460; supra note 67.
71. See Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2460; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968).
72. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (stating that the purpose central to the Terry
exception was to protect officers in potentially dangerous situations).
73. See id. (requiring reasonableness at inception, that an officer's conduct and manner
reasonably relate in scope to the purpose of the investigation, brevity, no change in location, and
the absence of circumstances resembling an arrest).
74. Transportation to a police station likely does not meet the brevity requirement of a Terry
stop. See Hayes, 470 U.S. at 815-16.
75. Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2459 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983);
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979)).
76. See Hiibel, 124 S.Ct. at 2455-60; Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212.
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standard for both the investigatory stop and the procurement of an arrest.
The majority failed to acknowledge the policy that justifies the lower
standard of Terry because Petitioner's arrest and conviction were, in fact,
more than minor inconveniences that do result in indignity.7"
Moreover, the instant Court overlooked the holding in Hayes, which
required a warrant or a showing of probable cause to transport a detainee
to a police station from a place where the detainee is entitled to be.79
Instead, the instant Court adopted the controversial dicta in Hayes,
suggesting that an officer may fingerprint a suspect at the site of detention
if the officer reasonably believes he can establish or negate a suspect's
connection with a crime. 0 However, in addition to ignoring the lengthy
history of undisturbed law,8 ' the Court misapplied the Hayes Court, in
dicta, by failing to establish exactly how Petitioner's identity would
determine his connection with the reported assault.82 Further, while the
Hayes dicta limited its opinion to authorization of an officer's request for
information, 3 the instant Court expanded the officer's authority by
establishing justification for arrestif the detainee refuses to comply.'
In sum, the holding may be interpreted as the instant Court's policy
judgment, favoring production of identity in all circumstances that meet
the low threshold of reasonable suspicion. 85 By focusing on the
government's interest in preventing identity from becoming a legal
nullity,86 the instant Court discounted factors and policies underlying
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as upheld in Brown, Terry, and Hayes. 7
The severe result is criminal sanction of behavior unrelated to the crime

77. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2458-60. The Court applied a double standard in utilizing the
reasonable basis test to justify arrest while failing to acknowledge the change of brevity and
duration of arrest. See id. at 2459. Under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the more appropriate
test requires a showing of probable cause before procuring an arrest. See Hayes, 470 U.S. at 814-15
(holding that a showing ofprobable cause is required when transporting a suspect to a police station
even when the detainee is not arrested).
78. See generallyHiibel, 124 S. Ct. 2451. But cf Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816; Terry, 392 U.S. at
10-11.
79. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459-60; Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816. Presumably, since the officer
did not arrest Petitioner on other grounds, Petitioner was located in a place where he was "entitled
to be." See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2455.
80. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459-60; Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816-17.
81. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459-60; supra text accompanying note 55.
82. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460. Instead, the Court required the request to have only a
reasonable relation to the initial detention. Id. But cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
83. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816.
84. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2459-60.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
86. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 26-28, 36-37, 40-41.
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that created the initial suspicion.88 Additionally, the instant Court's
expansion and misapplication of its own Fourth Amendment precedent89
dangerously narrows a citizen's rights in cases far beyond verbal identity.

Extension of the instant Court's decision beyond ad hoc application could
make commonsense the legal nullity.

88. See Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460 (suggesting authority for an officer to request on-site
fingerprinting but failing to establish a basis for arrest if the detainee refused to comply).
89. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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